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Family Ties: The European Court 
of Human Rights’ Protection of 
the Family and its Impact on 
Future Litigation 
Rebecca J. Cambron 
Abstract 
With family as the foundation for much of modern society’s 
structure, the European Union included familial and parental rights 
when protecting individuals from unwarranted government influence 
through the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. The European Court of Human Rights’s 
recent interpretation of the protection, however, in the case of 
Wunderlich v. Germany demonstrates a concerning shift in the Court’s 
jurisprudence. This Comment analyzes the shift occurring within the 
Court’s jurisprudence with respect to the protection of the family and 
parental rights regarding education, exploring the Court’s arch away 
from the foundational principles behind the Court’s formation and 
advocates for the adoption of levels of scrutiny that would protect 
familial rights. 
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I. Introduction 
La familia. For most, ‘family,’ whether through blood or other 
bonds, shapes who we are and how we see ourselves. Throughout the 
development of democratic society, the family has consistently formed 
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the foundation. As far back as Aristotle, society’s political relationship 
reflected those found in the family.1 Parents, as the guardians of 
children, help shape society’s future, including its politics, by molding 
their children’s political and social identities.2 This process continues 
through to today. 
Recently, the European Court of Human Rights (“the ECtHR” or 
“the Court”) has questioned the role the family plays in shaping the 
next generation.3 In Wunderlich v. Germany,4 the Court moved away 
from this historical understanding of the family—focusing on the state’s 
role: protecting and in effect determining the best interests of children.5 
On January 10, 2019, the ECtHR upheld a German court’s decision to 
interfere with the Wunderlich family by withdrawing a portion of the 
parent’s rights regarding their children and forcibly removing the 
Wunderlichs’ four children from the family home.6 The German 
government justified its action based on the parents’ choice to educate 
their children at home and refusal to send their children to one of the 
government-approved schools.7 
Under the Convention on the Political Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (“the Convention”), the state may only interfere with an 
individual’s “family life” in certain circumstances.8 Article 2 of the 
Protocol to the Convention, which amends the agreement, however, 
 
1. ISI Archive, The Family as the Basis for Political Existence, 
INTERCOLLEGIATE STUDIES INST. (Oct. 8, 2014), 
https://home.isi.org/family-basis-political-
existence[https://perma.cc/26EX-EXYR]. 
2. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS. VIII (Benjamin Jowett trans.) (c. 350 B.C.E), 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.8.eight.html 
[https://perma.cc/MA9S-KXH6] (noting the progression of society 
through individuals collecting into families, families into villages, and 
villages into states). 
3. See Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 10, 
2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994 
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM] (holding that German authorities’ 
removal of four homeschooled children from their family home did not 
violate Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms) [hereinafter Wunderlich].   
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 11. 
6. Id. at 16.  
7. Id. at 11. 
8. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 5, 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E5VU-SG9A] [hereinafter Convention]. 
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guarantees children the right to an education.9 The Court previously 
held that Germany’s law requiring school attendance at either the state 
schools or the authorized private schools—but no other alternatives—
did not violate the article.10 Because of the tension between these two 
rights, the Court’s decision received much attention both inside and 
outside of the European Union.11 The Court’s decision to permit 
Germany’s interference with the protected right to family life reflects a 
growing trend within the Court in allowing state governments to 
determine the balance struck between competing interests, resulting in 
the disintegration of parental and familial rights.12 
This Comment addresses the Court’s increasingly hostile view 
towards the family and its willingness to defer to the state’s judgment 
of the “best interests” of the child, usurping the traditional role of the 
parents. Part I describes the development of the Wunderlich case and 
outlines the Court’s analysis. Part II analyzes the Court’s holding in 
light of its recent decisions regarding home education and the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms’ Article 8’s protection for family life. This section will further 
explore the balance the Court has struck between these two protections 
and what that means for future cases. Finally, this Comment concludes 
by advocating for the return to the original values of the ECtHR and 
proposes the adoption of clear, tiered-levels of scrutiny to better 
examine state actions. 
 
9. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 




10. Wunderlich, at 12. 
11. See German official did not violate homeschoolers’ rights, European court 
says, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 11, 2019, 6:01 PM), 
https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/german-officials-did-not-
violate-homeschoolers-rights-european-court-says-85674 
[https://perma.cc/AN3F-V2H6] [hereinafter German Official]; German 
Family Pleads for Help from European Court of Human Rights, Home 
School Legal Defense Association (Apr. 2017), 
https://hslda.org/content/landingpages/Wunderlich/ 
[https://perma.cc/PZ3N-SD6M]. 
12. See Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 10, 
2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994 
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM]; Wetjen and others v. Germany, App. 
no. 68125/14 and 72204/14, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 3, 2018), 
http://www.iri.edu.ar/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ri-54-SG-
Jurisprudencia-Marzo-CASE-OF-WETJEN-AND-OTHERS-v.-
GERMANY.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJ6D-XHS4] (holding that there had 
been no violation of Article 8 by domestic courts in removing the parental 
rights of parents involved in corporal punishment against their children 
as part of their religious beliefs). 
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II. Reasoning Gone Wrong 
A. No Harm, Yes Foul? 
 
Since the early 1900s, Germany has effectively prohibited 
homeschooling, requiring compulsory school attendance at either state 
or private schools.13 Article 1666 of the German Civil Code requires 
local family courts to take the “measures necessary” to avoid harming 
the best interests of the child, including the obligation to attend 
school.14 In 2005, Dirk and Petra Wunderlich’s oldest child reached 
school age.15 They decided to educate their daughter at home and 
accepted the fines and criminal proceedings the German government 
pursued against them for this decision.16 Until 2008, when the family 
moved out of Germany, the only penalty or imposition on their family 
life that the Wunderlichs faced were the fines.17  
Three years later, however, in 2011, the Wunderlichs returned to 
Germany.18 On July 13, 2012, the German State Education Authority 
reported the Wunderlichs to the local family court claiming they were 
“deliberately and persistently” refusing to send their children to the 
local school.19 Based on the State Education Authority’s finding that 
the Wunderlichs were creating a “parallel world” for their children, the 
Darmstadt Family Court appointed a guardian ad litem for the 
children.20 
At an oral hearing, the family court withdrew the Wunderlich 
parents’ right to determine their children’s place of residence, their right 
to make a decision regarding the children’s schooling, and their right 
to apply to the authorities on behalf of their children.21 The court based 
its decision on its interpretation of the parents’ refusal to send their 
 
13. German Official, supra note 11. 




15. Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 6, 8 (Oct. 
10, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994 
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM].  
16. Id. ¶ 8. 
17. Id.  
18. Id.  
19. Id. ¶ 25. 
20. Id. ¶ 10-11. 
21. Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 12 (Oct. 
10, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994 
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM]. 
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children to an authorized school as not only a violation of German law, 
but also an abuse of parental authority which “risked damaging the 
children’s best interests in the long term.”22 The court stated, 
“Independent from the question of whether it could be ensured that the 
children were acquiring sufficient knowledge through the applicants’ 
homeschooling, the children’s not attending school was preventing them 
from becoming part of the community and learning social skills such as 
tolerance, assertiveness and the ability to assert their own convictions 
against majority-held views.”23 The Wunderlichs appealed the 
decision.24 
On April 25, 2013, the Frankfurt Main Court of Appeals denied the 
parents’ appeal.25 The court noted the children and parents’ resistance 
to all attempts at conducting a knowledge assessment.26 Regarding the 
law, the court found that withdrawing parental authority “presupposed 
a significant endangerment of the best interests of the child,” and the 
court utilized a balancing of the rights and interests of the children, 
parents, and society to reach its ruling.27 The court concluded that the 
Wunderlich parents created a danger by forming a “symbiotic” family 
system and did not meet the standards of education maintained by the 
state.28  
A few months later, on August 26, 2013, the German youth office 
met with the Wunderlichs and the Education Authority.29 The parents 
continued in their refusal to send their children to the authorized 
schools.30 Three days later, authorities and police officers removed the 
children from the home after they refused to comply with the court 
bailiff’s request to come voluntarily.31 On September 12 and 16, 2013, 
the children were assessed and determined to meet the appropriate class 
and schooling requirements.32 
Just prior to the assessments, however, on September 10, the 
Wunderlich parents agreed to send their children to school and on 
 
22. Id. ¶ 15. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. ¶ 13. 
25. Id. ¶ 15. 
26. Id. 
27. Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 15 (Oct. 
10, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994 
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM]. 
28. Id.  
29. Id. ¶ 18. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. ¶19. 
32. Id. ¶ 20. 
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September 19, the children were returned to their parents.33 Following 
the end of the 2013-14 school year, the Wunderlichs’ again pulled their 
children out of the state-authorized school.34 On August 15, 2014, in a 
parallel proceeding, the Frankfurt Main Court of Appeals found that 
despite having underwent learning assessments and attending school for 
a time, the parents were still considered to be “endangering” their 
children.35 The court did, however, determine that the detriment 
suffered by the children in being permanently removed from their home 
in order to attend an authorized school would significantly outweigh 
the danger posed by having them educated by the Wunderlichs at 
home.36 Specifically, the court found that: 
“[T]he learning assessment had showed that the knowledge level of 
the children was not alarming and that the children were not being 
kept from school against their will. Since permanent removal of the 
children from their parents would be the only possible way to ensure 
the continued schooling of the children, this was no longer 
proportionate as it would have a greater impact on the children than 
being homeschooled by their parents.”37 
The family appealed the original decision removing their parental 
rights, but the Federal Constitutional Court refused to hear the case.38 
Having exhausted all state processes, the family appealed to the 
ECtHR.39 
B. ECtHR’s Reasoning 
The Wunderlichs claimed that the German authorities’ interference 
with the Wunderlichs’ parental rights and the removal of their children 
violated their rights protected under Article 8 of the Convention.40 
Article 8 provides that: 
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his […] family life […] 2. 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise 
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and it 
 
33. Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 21 (Oct. 
10, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994 
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM]. 
34. Id. ¶ 22. 
35. Id. ¶ 23. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. ¶ 37. 
39. Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 37–38 
(Oct. 10, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994 
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM]. 
40. Id. ¶ 32. 
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necessary in a democratic society…for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”41 
The government did not contest that it interfered with the 
Wunderlich’s family life.42 It did, however, claim that such interference 
served the legitimate aim of protecting the health, rights, and freedoms 
of the Wunderlich children and was necessary in a democratic society, 
based on the children “grow[ing] up isolated within their own family 
enclave, in which the applicants [the parents] had ensured their children 
had established a strong attachment to them, to the exclusion of 
others.”43 
The ECtHR explicitly refrained from questioning Germany’s 
compulsory education law in its reasoning.44 Rather, the Court looked 
exclusively at the balance required under Article 8.45 It divided the 
question into two parts, first addressing whether the government’s 
actions were based on legitimate aims and then whether the actions 
were “necessary in a democratic society.”46 Ruling that the 
government’s withdrawal of parental authority and removal of the 
children did serve legitimate ends, the Court relied on the 
Government’s assertions that the authorities acted with the intention 
of protecting the children and that “there is nothing to suggest that it 
[the removal of parental authority] was applied for any other purpose 
in the present case.”47 The Court provided no further explanation of 
how the removal of children—against their own wishes and the wishes 
of their parents—tangibly served the best interests of the children.48 
The ECtHR provided a more in-depth analysis of whether the 
actions were “necessary in a democratic society.”49 As part of making 
this determination, it considered whether the government’s reasons for 
the action were “relevant and sufficient.”50 This requires that “[a] 
balance must be struck between the interests of the child and those of 
the parent and, in striking such a balance, particular importance must 
be attached to the best interests of the child which, depending on their 
 
41. Id. (citing the Convention, art. 8). 
42. Id. ¶ 39. 
43. Id.  
44. Id. ¶ 42. 
45. Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 42 (Oct. 
10, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994 
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM]. 
46. Id. ¶ 40.  
47. Id. ¶ 45. 
48. See id. 
49. Id. ¶ 46. 
50. Id. 
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nature and seriousness, may override those of the parent.”51 In 
conjunction with this balancing test, the court grants a “margin of 
appreciation” to the national authorities, particularly regarding 
intervention for the protection of children.52 
Applying this analytical framework, the existence of a more 
beneficial environment for the child to grow up in is not sufficient to 
create a necessity.53 Rather, the Court identified the Government’s 
finding that the children were endangered and socially isolated because 
of the parents’ decision to homeschool and held that the German 
government’s actions were reasonable and not a violation of Article 8.54 
Even though the government removed the children prior to an 
assessment of their actual knowledge, the ECtHR upheld the removal 
because it was reasonable in light of the information the youth office 
had.55 Taking these justifications into consideration, and because the 
Wunderlichs received the proper process and the government’s 
measures were proportionate to the dangers, the Court upheld the 
withdrawal of partial parental rights and the temporary removal of the 
children.56 
C. ECtHR’s Precedent on Family Rights and the Balancing of Interests 
Hidden beneath the discussion of “government inference,” the 
Wunderlichs’ situation rests on a host of previous cases where the Court 
addressed compulsory education laws and the parents’ right to have 
their child’s education conform to their religious and moral beliefs.57 
Rather than rule on these grounds, however, the Court side-stepped the 
question and relied on Article 8 as the basis for its reasoning.58 This 
dodge only leads back to the same fundamentally flawed application of 
the law, however. This flaw undermines the strike for liberty that the 
origination of the Court was for Europe. 
 
51. Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 46 (Oct. 
10, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994 
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM]. 
52. Id. ¶ 47. 
53. Id. ¶ 48. 
54. Id. ¶ 49. 
55. Id. ¶ 51. 
56. Id. ¶¶ 53–55. 
57. See, e.g., Konrad and Others v. Germany, App. no. 35504/03, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (2006) (prohibiting exemption from compulsory education for 
religious homeschool education). 
58. Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 43 (Oct. 
10, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994 
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM]. 
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Briefly summarizing the Court’s analysis from its jurisprudence on 
Article 8, the Court integrates a deference not only for the government’s 
determination of a necessity, but also for its determination of the best 
interests of the child.59 Determining a violation of Article 8 requires the 
Court to find: (1) a predicate government interference with private or 
family life, and (2) that either (A) the interference was not in 
“accordance with the law” and/or (B) it was not “necessary in a 
democratic society” for a specified interest.60 In its application, the 
analysis turns into a balancing of the parent’s obligation vs. the child’s 
best interest vs. the state’s interest, i.e. the necessity of the interest for 
a democratic society. “Necessity” under the ECtHR, “corresponds to a 
pressing social need and, in particular, …  it is proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued.”61 Because social needs are best determined by 
the state, the Court grants a margin of appreciation for the state’s 
action.62 States have a narrow margin of appreciation for interference 
with the family life.63 But that margin may fluctuate depending on the 
state’s proposed determination under the final portion of the balancing 
test: its necessity for a democratic society.64  
In comparison, the right to education found in Article 2 of Protocol 
1 provides that: 
“No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise 
of any functions which it assumed in relation to education and to 
 
59. Id. ¶ 47. 
60. Id. ¶¶ 43-44. 
61. Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1), 130 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 67 (1988). 
62. Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 47 (Oct. 
10, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994 
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM]. 
63. See Haase v. Germany, App. no. 11057/02, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 90 (2004) 
(“While the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in assessing 
the necessity of taking a child into care, in particular where an emergency 
situation arises, the Court must still be satisfied in the particular case 
that there existed circumstances justifying the removal of the child, and 
it is for the respondent State to establish that a careful assessment of the 
impact of the proposed care measure on the parents and the child, as well 
as of the possible alternatives to taking the child into public care, was 
carried out prior to implementation of the measure.”). 
64. See id. (“The margin of appreciation so to be accorded to the competent 
national authorities will vary in the light of the nature of the issues and 
the seriousness of the interests at stake.”); see also Elsholz v. Germany, 
App. no. 25735/94, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 49 (ruling that stricter 
scrutiny was required when assessing restrictions on such rights as the 
parents’ right to access or restricts which would limit current legal 
safeguards designed to protect the rights of parents and children, and 
holding that under this stricter analysis, Germany violated Article 8 in 
denying a father, attempting to maintain his access to his child, sufficient 
involvement in the decision-making process). 
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teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such 
education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and 
philosophical convictions.”65 
Developing a jurisprudence surrounding Article 2, the Court has 
sought to balance three competing interests in its jurisprudence: that 
of the child’s right to an education, the parents’ right to influence that 
education, and, as seen in the jurisprudence, the State’s goal to ensure 
pluralism in education.66 Pluralism, according to the Court, is essential 
for the preservation of the “democratic society” as conceived by the 
Convention.67 In addition to the preservation of pluralism, the state, 
under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, serves a fundamental and required 
role in regulating education.68 This role neither requires nor denies a 
state the ability to impose compulsory schooling laws.69 The Court only 
requires that such education be objective and pluralistic in its 
presentation.70 
Three cases outline the Court’s recent articulation of the balance 
of these interests and demonstrate the challenges to both Article 2 and 
Article 8. Starting in 1992, the Court considered a single mother’s 
complaint against the German state’s decision to require her to send 
her son to one of the approved schools.71 The mother challenged the 
requirement based on her religious convictions and concern about the 
“academic and moral decline in public schools where her son would be 
taught obscenities and become a victim of violent behaviour and 
negative socialisation pressure.”72 Given the regulatory authority 
presumptively granted to the state over education, the Court held that 
the state “must take care that information or knowledge is conveyed in 
an objective, critical and pluralistic manner.”73 In doing so, the rights 
of the parent cannot be used to deny the child its right to education.74 
The Court found that, after authorities reviewed the mother’s ability 
to provide for her son’s education alone, she was not capable and would 
 
65. Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 9. 
66. Konrad and Others v. Germany, App. no. 35504/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., 6-7 
(2006). 
67. Id. at 6. 
68. Id. at 6-7. 
69. Id. at 7. 
70. Dojan and Others v. Germany, App. no. 319/08, 2455/08, 7908/10, and 
8155/10, Eur. Ct. H.R., 14 (2011). 
71. Leuffen v. Germany, App. No. 19844/92, Eur. Ct. H.R., 1-2 (1992). 
72. Id. at 2. 
73. Id. at 3. 
74. Id. at 3-4. 
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in fact be damaging her son.75 This reasoning also justified the 
interference under Article 8.76 
Nearly a decade later in 2006, the Court again dealt with a 
challenge to both articles, this time from parents who did not want 
their children to receive the sex education classes from either public or 
private schools.77 Grounded in their religious concerns, the parents 
moved the German courts for exemptions from the compulsory 
education system, but where ruled against—not having the right to the 
“exclusive education of their children.”78 Exhausting their claims in 
Germany’s courts, the parents filed a complaint before the ECtHR.79 
The Court acknowledged the competing roles of the state and parents 
in regulating and influencing the education of the child.80 However, 
“respect is only due to the convictions on the part of the parents which 
do not conflict with the right of the child to education.”81 In 
determining if there was a conflict, the Court granted a “margin of 
appreciation” to Germany’s stated objectives—integration and 
socialization—holding that “those objectives cannot be equally met by 
home education even if it allowed children to acquire the same standard 
of knowledge.”82 This goal, in combination with the parents’ ability to 
educate their children after school and on weekends, formed the basis 
for the Court’s rejection of the parents’ complaint.83 Based on these 
reasons, the Court also found that the German law did not violate 
Articles 8 or 9.84 
Most recently in 2011, three couples, all members of the Christian 
Evangelical Baptist Church, appealed to the Court from Germany’s 
ruling requiring their children to attend a two-day school theater 
workshop raising awareness of the problem of sexual abuse.85 The 
applicants alleged that the requirement violated Article 2 of Protocol 
 
75. Id. at 4. 
76. Id. 
77. Konrad and Others v. Germany, App. no. 35504/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., 2, 7 
(2006). 
78. Id. at 2-3. 
79. Id. at 6. 
80. Id.  
81. Id. at 7. 
82. Id. at 8. 
83. Konrad and Others v. Germany, App. no. 35504/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., 8 
(2006). 
84. Id. at 9. 
85. Dojan and Others v. Germany, App. no. 319/08, 2455/08, 7908/10, 
8152/10, and 8155/10, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 10–11 (2011). 
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1, as well as Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention.86 In balancing the 
interests, the Court reasoned that the respect granted parents’ rights 
did not usurp the responsibility of the State to provide objective 
information.87 Rather, the Court found that accommodating every 
philosophical or moral objection would strain the State’s ability to 
provide educational materials.88 Because the State provided information 
in an “objective, critical and pluralistic manner” the Court found the 
pluralistic goal sufficiently within the State’s margin of appreciation to 
not violate the Convention or Protocol 1.89 
III. Trend Allowing Deference for Government 
Interference 
Analyzing the application of the balancing test for family rights 
and the role of the “needs of a democratic society” demonstrates an 
overarching shift in the Court’s precedent away from protecting 
educational or familial rights and towards a growing deference to the 
State’s determinations.90 This is best seen in the Court’s deference to 
pluralism in Article 2 cases and attempts under Article 8 to distinguish 
between real and hypothetical harm.91 Ultimately, such imbalance 
results in the Court failing to serve its initial purpose and protect 
citizens from encroaching state action. 
A. “Necessity” as the Mother of Deference 
The evolution of family and parental rights within the ECtHR 
reflects a dangerous trend towards supplanting the rights of the parents 
and family with the State’s determination of the needs of a democratic 
society. Within the realm of Article 2 of Protocol 1, the Court’s 
jurisprudence demonstrates the one-sided nature of the Court’s 
application of the balancing of interests. The protection of family life 
 
86. Id. ¶ 52. 
87. Id. ¶ 72-74. 
88. Id. ¶ 65 (explaining that although parents may require state schools to 
respect their childrens’ religious convictions, in order for institutionalized 
teaching to remain practicable, state schools must be able to disseminate 
objective information).  
89. Id. ¶ 72-74. 
90. See Jeffery Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 116, 129 (2004) (explaining that the court uses the 
balancing test for the margin of appreciation inconsistently). 
91. See George Letsas, Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation, 26 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 710–11 (2006) (discussing the power left to states 
to balance fundamental freedoms with the public interest, in regards to 
Articles 8–11).  
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exemplified in the Wunderlich case similarly mirrors this trend and 
shows its dangerous consequences—ultimately resulting in the State’s 
interference in families’ lives when no harm is present.92 Each of the 
three cases outlined above, articulates a religiously-based reason for 
why parents would wish to find an alternative to the state-authorized 
school.93 None of the cases resulted in the outright denial of the child’s 
education.94 But in each case, the Court deferred to the State’s objective 
of ensuring the socialization and pluralism it deemed necessary.95 
Similarly, under Article 8, the balancing test ends up tilted towards 
the government with its determinations trumping parents’ rights. This 
can be seen in the Court’s struggle to distinguish between a real risk of 
harm and religious considerations in Wetjen v. Germany.96 In Wetjen, 
the parent’s believed, based upon their religion, that they had the 
obligation to cane their children under the age of 12 when they were 
disobedient.97 The Court distinguished the right granted to parents to 
pass on their religious and philosophical beliefs from the Wetjen’s 
actions stating that, “[w]hile the Court has accepted that this [the 
passing on of moral convictions] might even occur in an insistent and 
overbearing manner, it has stressed that it may not expose children to 
dangerous practices or to physical or psychological harm.”98 Thus, the 
Court’s precedent has created a line drawn around parental rights based 
on philosophical beliefs, restricting the communication of those beliefs 
when they threaten the state’s determination of what interference is 
necessary in a democratic society. 
In either case, the analysis ends up tilted towards the state, creating 
a near presumption that interference with family life or the state’s 
determinations regarding education will not violate the Convention. 
 
92. Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 51 (Oct. 
10, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994 
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM]. 
93. See Konrad and Others v. Germany, App. no. 35504/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 
6 (Sept. 11, 2006); Dojan and Others v. Germany, App. no. 319/08, 
2455/08, 7908/10, and 8155/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 12 (Sept. 13, 2011); 
Leuffen v. Germany, App. No. 19844/92, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 18, 1992). 
94. See Konrad and Others v. Germany, App. no. 35504/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 
3 (Sept. 11, 2006); Dojan and Others v. Germany, App. no. 319/08, 
2455/08, 7908/10, and 8155/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 16 (Sept. 13, 2011); 
Leuffen v. Germany, App. No. 19844/92, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 18, 1992). 
95. See Konrad and Others v. Germany, App. no. 35504/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 
7 (Sept. 11, 2006); Dojan and Others v. Germany, App. no. 319/08, 
2455/08, 7908/10, and 8155/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 15 (Sept. 13, 2011); 
Leuffen v. Germany, App. No. 19844/92, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 18, 1992). 
96. Wetjen and others v. Germany, App. no. 68125/14 and 72204/14 2018, 
Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 77–78 (2018).  
97. Id. ¶ 10. 
98. Id. ¶ 66. 
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This overemphasis on the state’s analysis reflects the positive 
obligations the Court has interpreted Article 8 and Article 2 to require 
from states. As one author noted:  
“[This positive interpretation] reflects a social view of human rights 
according to which it is the obligation of the State to take whatever 
action is needed to promote human dignity and worth. It attributes a 
much greater role to the state in the promotion of human welfare than 
does the liberal view. In the latter, the individual is to be protected 
from the State; in the social view, the individual achieves freedom and 
dignity through the State.”99 
While it is not generally disputed that states should interfere in 
order to protect individual’s rights from others, such as protecting 
children from abuse or ensuring parental access in cases of divorce, the 
Court’s acceptance of state interference reaches into the world of 
hypothetical harms. 
The Wunderlichs’ experience demonstrates this overstep. 
“Necessity,” according to the Court’s case law implies the existence of 
(a) a “pressing social need” and (b) that the interference is 
“proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”100 No emergency 
situation existed in the Wunderlichs’ home.101 Rather, the State knew 
of the family’s intentions and past in choosing to homeschool their 
children.102 Yet, the State ended the Wunderlichs’ parental right to 
determine where their children lived based the children’s unwillingness 
to undergo knowledge assessments.103 But Germany still acknowledged 
that the removal was “not necessary from an ex post perspective.”104 
The Court acknowledged that the state’s fears about homeschooling 
were outweighed by the damage the removal of the children from the 
home had on them—but still permitted the interference.105 
B. (Un)Balanced Interests and the Need to Account for Harm 
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Fundamentally, the unbalanced nature of the ECtHR’s 
interpretation undermines the principles foundational to the Court. 
With the scars of World War II still fresh, the Congress of Europe, 
forerunner of the modern European Union, set about to construct a 
judicial mechanism to protect  human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.106 Lodovico Benvenuti, the Secretary General of the Council 
of Europe at the time of the Convention’s adoption, said, “[This 
Convention] provides foundations on which to base the defence of 
human personality against all tyrannies and against all forms of 
totalitarianism.”107 Described as a “Bill of Rights for free Europe,”108 
the very act of granting more power to the state over the individual or 
family subverts the strike for individual liberty made by the acceptance 
of the Convention and marks a passive approval of an over-empowered 
state. Unlike the International Court of Justice, established through the 
United Nations that only has jurisdiction over disputes between states, 
the ECtHR’s application process permits individuals to challenge state 
decisions.109 In addition to these protections for individuals, the 
Convention also provided for the protection of family rights and 
education.110 
This deference results in no real limitations or guidance for states 
actions—like children in need of rules for proper behavior, states may 
run wild, legislating as they see fit. As one justice noted, “The empty 
phrases concerning the State’s margin of appreciation—repeated in the 
Court’s judgments for too long already—are unnecessary 
circumlocutions, serving only to indicate abstrusely that the States may 
do anything the Court does not consider incompatible with human 
rights.”111 Clarifying the margin of appreciation through the application 
of stricter scrutiny, even levels of scrutiny in light of the rights at issue, 
could rebalance the scale of justice.  
This recalibration would carry with it two benefits. First, it would 
better identify that not all state interference is justified in the same 
manner. Thirty years have passed without a truly clear articulation of 
the “margin of appreciation.”112 And this is reflected in the 
jurisprudence of the court. As such, the state could assert that not 
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providing a child with a cough drop was just as dangerous to their 
health, in the eyes of the state, as withholding emergency medical care. 
The Court would have no clearly articulated law which identified the 
distinction, intuitive to the world, that those actions should not be 
treated the same under the law. 
Second, it would recognize that the state does have a role in 
ensuring the basic needs of children are met. Even those who categorize 
Germany’s actions in the Wunderlich case as inappropriate government 
interference, recognize that states have a responsibility to protect 
children from abuse.113 Integrating a varied level of scrutiny for 
determining the “necessity in a democratic society” of the government’s 
interference would maintain the government’s ability to step in when 
harm is occurring.114 For example, the Court could distinguish analysis 
of state interference in abuse cases, from those involving the right to 
education, which initially started the state’s complaint against the 
Wunderlichs, and recognize that the right to education did not imply 
that any actual, physical harm was being done to the children. 
IV. Conclusion 
The ECtHR cannot continue to claim to protect the citizens of the 
European Union while consistently deferring to State judgments. The 
Wunderlich family’s struggles within the Court identify the tension 
between these obligations and family rights. Though the Wunderlichs’ 
caused no harm to their children, the Court permitted the state to step 
in and interfere with one of the most fundamental relationships in 
society. The tension only escalates when looking at the Court’s rulings 
in other cases. Either by denying the need to provide alternatives to 
sex education classes or presuming a denial of education based on it 
taking an alternative form—the protection enshrined in the Convention 
undergoes a constant reinterpretation by the states. Supplanting the 
current method of analysis and utilizing a higher standard of scrutiny 
that roughly corresponds to the harm actually wrought would help 
realign the ECtHR with its founding ideas.  
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